The agreements provided new weapons to the USSR, while supplying Germany with one million tonnes of feed grain, nine hundred thousand tonnes of oil, half a million tonnes of phosphate, half a million tonnes of iron ore, and chromium and other raw materials.  As France was no longer able to be the guarantor of the status quo in Eastern Europe and the Third Reich pushed Romania to make concessions to the Soviet Union, the Romanian government gave in, after the Italian Council and the recent example of Von Vichy France. According to other indications, the first sign of a Soviet-German political détente was the discussion between Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov and Ernst von Weizs-cker, Secretary of State at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 17 April 1939, first, on a possible improvement of relations. A series of perceived German goodwill signals ensued and the replacement of Litvinov with Molotov.    According to Geoffrey Roberts, recently published documents in Soviet diplomatic records show that Western historians were mistaken in assuming that the Merekalov-Weisz-cker meeting of April 1939 was the source of Soviet signals of détente with Nazi Germany.  His view, supported by Derek Watson and Jonathan Haslam, is that it was only late July 1939-August 1939, and that it was more a consequence than a cause of the collapse of the Franco-Anglo-Soviet negotiations on the tripartite alliance. Molotov and Stalin must have realized in August 1939 that an agreement with Germany would avoid an immediate war with that country and could meet the territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union in eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Bessarabia; Considering that an alliance with Great Britain and France did not offer territorial gains and risked a war with Germany, where the USSR was most likely to bear the burden of a German attack.  Look at why Hitler`s request for the Sudetenland became an international crisis and assessed the agreement reached by Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier. Until 10 August, the countries had worked out the final technical details to conclude their economic agreement to the end, but the Soviets delayed the signing of the agreement by almost ten days until they were sure they had reached a political agreement with Germany.  The Soviet ambassador told German officials that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations “with little enthusiasm” at a time when they thought that Germany was “not getting along” and that parallel talks with the British could not be interrupted simply after “mature reflection”. In the meantime, all German military and economic studies had argued that without at least Soviet neutrality, Germany would be doomed to defeat.
 The Soviet Union had not been able to conclude a collective agreement with Britain and France against Nazi Germany, notably at the Munich conference in September 1938.